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Sanctionsare measures that one party (thesender)takes to influence the
actions of another (the target). Sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, have
been used, for example, by creditors to get a foreign sovereign to repay debt
or by one government toinfluence thehumanrights, trade,or foreign policies
of another government. Sanctions can harm the sender as well as the target.
The credibility of such sanctions is thus at issue. We examine, in a
game-theoretic framework, whether sanctions that harm both parties enable the
sender to extract concesaiona. We find that they can, and that their thrust
alone can suffice when they are contingent on the target's subsequent
behavior. Even when sanctions are not used in equilibrium, however, how much
compliance they can extract typically depend-s upon the coats that they would
impose on each party,
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Withinnationalboundaries, laws and contracts allow parties to influence
each other's actions. A third party, the legal system, can punish those vho
break laws or breach contracts. In contrast, the interactions of sovereign
governments, or of parties under the jurisdictions of different sovereign
governments, typically lack third parties to enforce contracts and agreements.
Hence, parties to such contrscts or agreements mustthemselvesbe willing to
enforce them if they are to have any effect. Enforcement may then require
measures that affect the other party directly, without involving anyone else.
Economic sanctions, steps by a government that inflict harm on another
country, possibly at a cost to itself, are such measures.
National governments have often used economic sanctions to affect
policies of other countries.' The United States government, for example, has
banned trade with Cuba and South Africa in response to policier of their
governments. U.S. trade law calls for trade restrictions against countries
found to engage in practices that damage U.S. industry or infringe upon U.S.
intellectual property. Finally, collecting repayment from debtor governments
may require that creditor countries threaten to curtail financial relations or
trade with debtor countries. In each of these circumstances, one national
government tries to affect the actions of another by threatening, or by
actuallytsking seesures that are likelyto han both countries.
Weexamine the potential for sanctions to elicit desired behavior from
Oaoudi and Dajani (1983) and Hufbeuer at al. (1985) provide detailed case
studies of several historical situationsin which national governments have
used economic sanctions, successfully and otherwise, to pursue foreign policy
obj ectivea,another party. We consider the interaction over time of two parties, called
the sender and the the target.2 The sender would like to affect the target's
actions. It has the power to harm the target, but at a cost to taef,
We consider two types of actions that the sender aight wish to affect.
One is the target's ongoing choice of some action, such as the target's
debtservice payments, trade policies, pollution, or degree of protection of
intellectual property. Another is the target's once—and—for—all choice of an
irreversihle action, such as ceding territory, releaeing s hostage,
extraditing an accused criminal, or relinquishing power to a new government.
We examine whether sanctions that are costly both to the sender and to
the target enable the sender to alter the behavior of the target.4 When they
can, we also consider whether the threat alone of such sanctions is enough, or
whether they must actually be used.
The answers depend critically on the dynamics of the interaction between
the sender and target. One issue is whether sanctions are contingent on what
the target then does, or are purely spiteful in the sense of imposing a cost
independent of the target's subsequent actions. Sanctions, for example, si5'nt
be imposed or renewed only occasionally (as by a legislature), but enforced
continuously (as by an executive or judiciary). Legislation could then
instruct the executive or judiciary to lift sanctions as soon as the target
are using the terminology of Hufbeuar et sl. (1985).
3The relationshipbetween sender and target resembles that between
principal andagent in contract theory. See, for example. toss (1973). Our
concern here is not with the nonobservability of the target's (egent's)
action, which has been the focus of this litarature, but with the sender's
(principal's) ebility to enforce a contract with the target (agent).
4For example, the failure of the grain embargo imposed by the United
States against the Soviet Union sfter its invasion of Afghanistan is tommonly
attributed to the toss of export revenue it implied for U.S. farmers. See
Oauodi and Dajani (1983) or }Iufbauer et sI. (1985) for a discussion.-3-
perform.dasspecified.The Jackson Amendmentlinkingmoat favored nation
statusto free emigration is an example (See Oaoudi and Dajani, 1983).
Another issue is whether, when setting its own policy, each party knows
the ocher's current policy. A repeated-gsme specification implies the
ccntrary. In the context in which economic sanctions are used, however,
parties seem to set policiesfora period, owingcurrentpolicies elsewhere,
but also knowing chat these policies may change later. interaction of this
sort can be captured by' assuming that parties alternate in setting policies.
As a benchmark, we first suppose that the parties do set their policies
at the same time. The standard theory of repeated games then applies. As the
Folk Theorem implies, if the parties' relationship continues indefinitely then
many outcomes can be supported as subgasie perfect equilibria. But if stricter
equilibrium criteria are applied, the sender has no control over the target:
One criterion yielding this result is that the equilibrium be the limit of
finite horizon equilibria, what we tall a limit ecuilibrius.Anotheris that
it be Markov oerfect. This criterion specifies that each party's strategy
depend only on variables that directly affect the parties' current and future
payoffs, and not what might affect current and future payoffs only through the
response of the other party.5
Our paper focuses primarily on limit and on Matkov perfett equilibria.
These provide a mucbsharpercharacterization of outcomes than subgame
perfection alone, andwe find themto be of intrinsic interest: Many
situations mayinfact involve only finite interaction, while Markov
5See Maskin and Tirole (l988b) and Farrell and Maskin (1987). Any
equilibrium in which responses are payoff relevant is one equilibrium in a
specification in which payoff relevance is not imposed gorion.ifone party
doesnot respond to payoff irrelevant information then there is no gain to the
other of responding to such information.
-perfection requires parties to use the subgaise perfect equilibrium strategies
thatareinformational!7 most parsimonious.
Inan alternating mov, framework, if sanctions are noncontingent then it
raisinsa (limit or Markov perfect) equilibrium for the sender to have no
power over the target. This is the only limit equilibrium. There are,
however, Markov perfect equilibria in which the sander can obtain concessions,
but it must ectually impose sanctions to do so.
In contrast, oontingent sanctions can ensure the sender a degree of
control over the target's actions in a limit or Markov perfect equilibrium,
and the threat alone of sanctions suffices. If the sender seeks to influence
an ongoing policy of the target then, under general conditions, there is a
Markov perfect equilibrium in which the level of compliance depends upon the
costs of sanctions to both the sender and the rarget, and on each psrty's
patience. This can also be a limit equilibrium. In the only other possible
steady-state Markov perfect equilibrium, which is not a limit equilibrium, the
only outcome is for the target to concede to the maximum, i.e., to the point
at which conceding iscre would be worse for it than enduring sanctions and
conceding nothing. This can happen if and only if sanctions are not too
harmful to the target.
We also find that contingent sanctions tan enable the sender to exact a
once-and-for-all concession from the target. The sender might or might not
actuallyhave to usesanctions,
In suary, thecostliness of sanctions to the sender need. not render
them ineffective, and sanctions can be effective even if, in equilibrium, they
arenot actually used.
This finding contrasts with Bulow and Rogoff's (1989, p. 168) result,
from a Rubinatein bargaining framework, that, if imposing sanctions on aII, The Basic Framework
More formally. we consider the interaction of two parties, the sender and
target, each of which controls the level, of a particular variable. The target
chooses the level a e A, A c R, of some activity that affects its own and the
senders utility in opposite directions, while the eender chooses a level
a E 0, S C, ofsanctions that affect both itself and the target adversely.
The per period utility of the sender is u5(a,s), which increases in a,
decteases in a, and is continuous in both variables while the target's
utility per period is uT(a,s), whi'ch decreases in a and a, and is continuous
in both.7 Hence the sender rsost prefers the target to choose the caximum
level of a while the target most prefers the minimum level. The per period
discount factor is for the sender and S,, for the target, where 0 6, C1
i —S,T.
with ongoing actions we usually let the target's choice set A be a
continuum, and set A —toIl,We treat irreversible actions as dichotonuus,
however and set A —(0,1k
Soae sanctions, such as the level of a punitive tariff, can be
continuously varied over some set S.If so, we set S —0,11.Other
sanctions are more discrete, such as an embargo, boycott or a military attack.
Hence we also consider sanctions that are just on or off, and set S —(0,1)
The sender's highest possible per period utility level (bliss) is
therefore u5(I,0), achieved when the sender chooses the maximum value of a
debtor country is costly to credirora, then the "threat to seize shipments is
not credible and they will not be paid a peso in a perfect equilibrium."
7'Increaaing" and "decreasing" are used in the strict sense throughout.(one) and no sanctions are in place. Bliss for he target is
attained when a is at its minimum value (zero) and no sanctions are in place.
l's normalize bliss for each party at one; i.e. ,weset:
S T u (10) —u(0,0) —1.
The sender's minimum individually rational utility level, the highest per
period utility it can achieve given the least advantageous, for the sender,
behavior of the target (i.e., setting a —0),is attained by setting sanctions
at zero, yielding u(0,O) .Thetarget's minimum individually rational utility
laval uT(Cl) ocrurs when sanctions are at their maximum level (one) and is
antained at a —0.We normalize each party's minimum individually rational
utility levels at zero; i.e., we set:
S T u (0,0) —to (0,1)—0.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In Sections III, IV, and
V the sender seeks to affect the target's ongoing performance, while in
Senriono VI and VIIittries tomake the target take an irreversible action.
In Sectiun ElIthesender and target siaulraneously choose o and a each
period. In the remaining sections they alternate in choosing. In Sections
III and IV sanctions are noncontingent, while elsewhere they are tontingent on
the target's eubeequenc performance.
III. Exacting Ongoing Performance: Simultaneous Moves
Consider a situation in which the target thonses some level of actioneach period, while the sender simultaneously decides what level of sanctions
to impose. Say that sanctions are nonconcingent.
Any one-shot play of this game has, as a unique Nash equilibrium in
dominant strategies, the sender setting s —Uand the target setting a —0.
That is, the option cf imposing sanctions fails to give the sender any ability
toaffectthe target's choice.
Thisoutcome remains the only Nash equilibrium outcome if the game is
finitely repeated. However, ifit isrepeated anindefinitenumber of
periods, then the relationship between the sender and target is an
infinitely-repeated game, for which there are many other subgane perfect
equilibrium outcomes.
Figures Ia and lb depict the oct of possible per period utility levels of
the sender (on the horizontal axis) and target (on the vertical axis). Points
onthenortheast frontier of this set represent Pareto-efficient outcomes.
Figure Ia is drawn under the assumption that uTo..o) > 0, i.e., that
setting a —Iand suffering no penalty yields a per period utility above the
ainimum individually rational utility level (normalized atzero): Sanctions
inflictso such harm on the target that the target prefers to perform at any
feasible level and avoid sanctions rather than to suffer the penalty. Here
sanctions have overkill capacity.
Figure lb is drawn under the opposite assumption: The target prefers to
suffer sanctions at their worst rather than to perform at the maximum feasible
level. Here sanctions have limited capacity. In this case we define a as the
action level at which the target's per period utility, with aanctiona at zero,
is at the minimum individually rational level, Le., uT(.o) —0.
The Folk Theorem (Fudenberg and .'laakin, 1986) assures that, for —
sufficientlyclose to 1, there exist aubgame perfect equilibria sustaining anyfeasible outcome that strictly Pareto dominates the minimum individually
rational payoff pair. In the diagrams these outcoaes correspond to all
feasible points in the northeast quadrant.
The outcome s —a—0(no performance and no penalization) is of course
still sustainable, but there are many ocher possibilities as well. For the
case illustrated in Figure ia, any Pareto-efficient outcome is sustainable,
including the outcome s —0and a —1(bliss for the sender), but inefficient
outcoaes in which some penalization occurs are also sustainable.
In Figure lb the target's individual rationality constraint admits am
steady states only outcomes in which the level of complisnce is less than a.
In this case the cost of the penalty to the target limits the extent of
conpliance that the sender can exact in steady state.
Note that, in the limit as 5 approachea one, the cost to the sender of
imposing sanctions does not affect the set of efficient euatainable outcomes.
The sender finds it worth incurring any finite cost for a finite number of
periods in order cc extract a higher level of compliance in perpetuity.'
The case in which sanctions are contingent or actions or sanctions (or
1For discount factors —
5T
sufficiently close to one and for N
sufficiently large, the following triggers strategies provide one way of
supporting compliance at an action level a* as a subgeme perfect outcome:
Consider first the following rule R for the sender: Set s —Iif the target
has set a c a* in any of the previous N periods. The strategy for the sender
is to set s —IifaC a*in any of the previous N periods and if the sender
has always adhered to R previou.sly, and to set s —0otherwise, The strategy
for the target is to set a —a*if the sender has always adhered to R
previously and a0 otherwise. For the overkill case (illustrated in
Figure Ia) a* can lie anywhere in [0,1]. For the case in which sanctions have
limited capacity (illustrated in Figure lb), e* cannot exceed .-9,.
both) are dichotomous can be handled similarly.9
In conclusion a wide range of possible (efficient and inefficient)
outcomes can be supported as subgame perfect equilibria in a repeated geme
with costly sanctions. However, the only limit or Karkov perfect equilibrium
repeats the outcome of a one-shot game,withactions and sanctions at zero,
Hence) the sender can extract a performance level above zero only if the
parties expect to interact indefinitely end condition their decisions on past
decisionsthat no longer affect current or future payoffs.11
IV.Exacting Ongoing Performance: Alternating 4oves with Ncncontingent
Sanctions
So farwe have examined the efficacy of sanctions in a repeated game in
which theparties choose simultaneously each pertod, without having observed
the other's current choice, Perhaps a more realistic assumption is that Party
1setsits choicefor a period of time (which may be very short), having
observed Party l's previous choice, which remains in affect for the moment,
Havingobserved Us choice, which itself remains in effect for the moment, 2
cay subsequently respond by makinga different choice, After 2 responds, 1
51fsanction-s are contingent, utilities at outcomes (0,0), (0,1) and (1,0)
are unaffected, as is the efficient frontier (along which s —0).Hence the
act of efficient sustainable outcomes is unaffected.
1f both are dichotomous then only the four extreme points in Figure taor
lb are attainable in the one-shot game. Average or expected utility peira in
the convex hull of thesepointsare attained by generating the four outcomes
with various possible frequencies: either as the realization of a random
process with a given distribution (I.e. by "correlated atrategies) or asa
periodic (but deterministic) function of time. In an average or expected
utility sense, then, the Folk Theorem epplias as above.
"Farrell and Maskin'a (1987) requirement that equilibria be "weakly
renegotiation-proof" reduces the set of possible subgame petfect outcomes to
the shaded regions in Figurea la and lb. See Appendix A for an explanation.- 10-
canmake another choice, knowing how 2 responded to its previous choice, and
so on. Each time it chooses, each party takes theentiresequence of future
choices into account in deciding its best current choice.
AnAjternsrthzdove Framework
Thistype of interaction can be studied by assuming that the partiea
choose only in alternste periods, with only one party choosing in each period.
The outcome in any period is detenined hy one party's current choice and the
other patty's choice the previous period.u
Applying this framework to our situation means that the sender chooses a
level of sanctions having observed the target's current performsnce level, but
knoving that the target can change this level before the sender can reset the
level of sanctions. Similarly, the target decides its action having observed
the current severity of sanctions, but realizing that the sender can reset the
level of sanctions before the target can respond.
With the additional requirement that strategies be payoff relevant, each
party's strategy can be specified as a reaction function of its rival's
current choice. Hence, we specify the sender's strategy in setting the leve]I
of sanctions s as a function R5(e) cf the target's current action level a and
the target's strategy in setting a as a function at(s) of s, If mixed
strategies are used then R5(s) and aT(s) are rendom variables. Where there is
no ambiguity we use R5(a) and aT(s) to denote the support of these variables'
distrihutions.
Markov perfection implies that the maximum discounted present value of
mcyert and de Groot (1970), Maskin and Tirole (1987,l988a,1988b) Gertner
(1986), Davies (1987) and Eaton and Engers (1989,1990) have analyzed
duopoliscic onmpetition in a similar alternating-move framework. The
Rubinstein (1992) bargsining model also posits an alternating-move ftsmework.- 11-
currentand future payoffs to the sender at the time it sets the sanction
level.a depends only on the targets current action. Given J,thisvalue,
denoted V'5(a), can be obtained recursively by dynamicprogramming:
V3(a)—supE(u2(a,s) +s5uu[aT(s),sJ
+
whereE is the expectations operator. Equivalently, for the target, the
maximumdiscountedpresent value of current and future payoffs atthetime it
setsthe action level a depends only on thesander's current sanction level.
Given K2, this value, denoted VT(S), is similarly obtained:
VT(s)—supEuT(a,s) +STuLa.R(afl+4VT(aS(a)j.
AMarkovoerfecc enuilibrium is apairof reaction functions K2 and RT
suchthat, given aT, for each a in A, R5(a) attains V2(a) and, given B?,for
T T
each s in 5,K. (a)attatns V (a).
Henceforth, we use the unqualified termequilibrium"to mean "Harkov
perfect equilibriums and refer to limit equilibria explicitly.
TheImoossibilitvof Ex,tctins Perfornence Efficient,Zr
it is still truethat,when sanctions are noncontingent. the pair of
strategies R2(a —0for all a and KT(a) —0for all a is anequilibrium,with
theoutcome a —a—0every period:If the sender will under no circumstances
impose sanctions in the future then the target has no reason to set a >0even
if sanctionswere for some reason currently in place. Similarly, if the12 -
targetwill under no circumstances set a >0in the future then sanctions
impose only costs and no benefits to the sender.
Furthermore, while this is the only limit equilibrium, there can be other
equilibria. But any outcome that these support willnotbe efficient: Ii the
target (at least occasionally) sets a >0,then the sander must (at Least
occasionally)set s >0.Hence the only equilibrium outcome in which
sanctions are never actually imposed is one in which thetargetnever
performs. This result follows from:
Proposition 1:If R5[RT(O)J —0 then RT(a) —0 for all a.
The proof of this result, and ail our remaining ones, are inAppendix B.
A Sanctions Cycle
Thereare, however, equilibria in which the target does sometimee make
concessions and in which the sender does sometimes actually impose sanctions,
Say, fcc example, that sanctions and actions are dichotomous (S —CIIand
A —(Cl))and consider the following reactions:
R3(C) —1;R3(l) —C
—0;RJ(l) .—ii
These generate a cycle of length four periods over which all combinations of
actions and sanctions occur: High performance elicits the removal of
sanctions that in turn engenders low performance followed by the reimposition
of sanctions, etc.- 13-
Thesereactions are an equilibrium if, for instance,4a 1/2and





These utility functions have the property that, as a increases, the cost
of sanctions decreases to thesenderand increases to the target. 13Ifa is a
transfer of income, for exanple, since sanctions halve the utilities of both
parties, th.morethe target transfers, the acre costly are sanctions to the
sender, and the less costly are they to the target. -
V.Exacting Ongoing Performance: Alternating Moves with Contingent Sanctions
So far we have analyzed a repeated game and an alternating move game in
which sanctions ate not contingent on the target's level of performance. Two
results have emerged: First, in order to raise the target's action level
above zero in equilibrium, the sender must (at lease on occasion) endure the
cost of imposing senctions, Second, no perfonance and no sanctions in all
periods is always an equilibrium outcome, and it ia the only limit equilibrium
'°For simplicity these utility functions (and their generalizations in
xanple 2 below) are not normalized. To normalize them, subtract 1 from each.
More generally to normalize any utility function subtract the minimum
individually rational utility, and then divide by the difference between
utility at bliss and the minimum individually rational utility.- 14-
outcome.We shall show, however, that theseresultsdo not hold when the
sender can impose sancttons that are contingent upon the target's performance.
Suppose that sanctions are dichotomous (S —(0,11)while the action is
ccntinucus (A —{0,lfl In each period inwhichthe sender moves it specifisa
a threshold c. Sanctions will be experienced in the current period if and
only if the current action level is less than t. Similarly, they will be
experienced the subsequent period if and only if the target subsequently
chooses an action level below t.
The possible decisions of the sender and target can each be classified
into twocategories:When choosing its action level a, given the sender's
current threshold performance level t, the target may either arsileste by
setting a at or above t (thus averting sanctions in the current period), or
else .gjJ by choosing a below t (automatically triggering sanctions).
Similarly, observing the target's current action level a, the sender may
either condone this level by setting t at or below a (thus averting sanctions
in the current period) or else it by setting t above a (thus inflicting
sanctions in the current period) ,Matchingby the sender is condoning by
cecting t —a,while matching by the target is acquiescing by setting a —
inthis framework, a payoff—relevant strategy for the sender is a
reaction function A5 mapping each possible action level to a threshold while a
payoff relevant strategy for the target is a reaction function T mapping each
possible threshold to an action level.To denote that sanctions are in effect
if and only if a is below t, let u(t,a) —1if a 'C t and s'(t.a) —Uif a ￿ t,
As before, dynamic programming gives the value functions V3 and Vt of each
party if the reaction function of the other party is specified. Some
additional notation will prove useful. The expected discounted utility of the
sender, having set a threshold t the previous period, in a period in which the- 15
target choosas, is:
—E(uS[at(t)q(taT(tfl]+&3vS[Rt(t)fl.
Similarly, the expected discounted utility of the target having set an action
level a the previous period, in a period in whichthesender chooses, is:
wTca) —E(uT[a,a(RS(a),a)]+8V[R (a)]l.
The expeccad discounted value to the sender of currently choosing an
arbitrary threshold t, given the target's action level, a, is:
Z5(a,t) —u5[a,r(t,e)]+
andthe expected discounted value to the target of currently choosing an
arbitrary action level a, given thesender'sthreshold t, is:
ZT(c,a) —uT[a,r(t,s)I+
LetC(a) denote argmexZ5(a,t)end let CT(t) denote argieax ZT(a,t).
t a
Then lt and 'r constitute an equilibrium if andonlyif:
Va e (0,1], RS(a) c cSca andVtG (0,l, Rt(t) C Ct(t).
If so:- 16-
— maxZ5(a,t)and VT(c) —maxZT(a.t).
Z6(a.t) is increasing in a; hence is. Similarly, ZT(t,a) is nonincreasing
int; hence
We say thata isa steady state ofthe equilibriumif i— aT—P.5(a).
Proposition2 states that if sanctions have limited capacity then there exists
an equilibrium that supports ,thetarget's highest individually rational
action level, as its unique steady state.
Proposition 2: If 3d1 such that uT(a,o) —uT(Ol)then, fot




where a sattsttas u (al) +(al)—0.
These reaction functions aredepicted in Figure 2.The sendet always
setsas a threshold, thus spurning all action levels below .(&must be
large enough to ensure that condoning at levels below a is no better.) A: or
belowthe target is indifferent between acquiescing to ;andspurning to
zero, both of which dominate just meeting the threshold above a. Between a
and a this indifference is resolved by balking to zero but aitself is
matched.Atthresholdsabovebalking to zero is beat.
Thustheaction level at which the target is at its minimal individually- 17-
rationalutility level if it is feasible, can be sustained s.s a steady state.
We now show that under fairly general conditions there is just oneother
equilibrium that supports a steady state, We characterize this equilibrium
and show that itsupportsa band of steady states lying below a, whose width
rends to zero as either patty's discount factor tends to one.
We now impose the restrictions (i) that the cost of sanctions to the
sender increase and (ii) that the cost of sanctions to the target increase
in the target's action level. That is, u3(a,O) -u5(a,l)everywhere increases
T T
in a while u (a,0) -u(al) nowhere increases in a.
Under these restrictions weusefive lemmata to prove twotheoremsthat
ensure the existence of, and completely characterize, equilibrium steady—state
outcomes.
:1. Lemma 1 says that there is an action level g such that the sender
condones all action levels above g and spurns all those below :
Lemma 1: 3 such that Va < a, CS(a) > a and Va > a, C3(a) Ss.
Laoima 2 says that the sender will never spurn to a threshold that it
would spurn if the target performed at that level:
Lemma 2: If b e C5(a) and b > a then C5(b) Sb.
Lemma 3 states that, if there is a point n at which the target does not
balk (Le. is "nice"), then the sender, when facing an action level of at
least n, never sets a threshold that the target strictly prefers to o:- -
Lemma3: If RT(n)n, a. an, and I E C(a) then vT(t) ￿
Lemma Acharacterizesarty point n at which neither balking nor spurning
occurs. Raising its action level above n leaves the target worse off as of
the following period (i) while lowering the threshold below n makes the
sender no betcar off as of the following period (iii). The larget will always
match at n (ii), and it is optimal for the sender to match at n (iv).
Finally, V1(n) andW'(n)have the same values that they would if n were a
steady state (v and vi).
Lemma 4: Suppose that R9(n) Snand R'(n) n.
(i)If a> n, then W1() c T(n).
(ii) If tSn, then cT(t) s n. musRT(n)—n-
(iii) If t < n, then W3(t) a W(n).
S (iv) nec (n).
(v)V5(n) —(n)—
(vi)VT() —VT(n)—J(n,O)/(l-51).
Letdenote minla,l), the largest feasible action level that gives the
target at least its minimal individually rational payoff. Let B —Etc0,1]:
cTc.t) n (Dl) $$,i.e.,3 is the set of all thresholds t at which it is
optimal for the target to balk. If B is not empty let —infB while if B is
emptylet—1.
Lemma 5:B is an interval and 01(t)isa constant for all t e B.
If 3 is nonempty we define V —VT(t)for all t e 3. We now state:- i_p-
Theorem1:(i) If ￿ g and there is a steady state then itisat —a.
(ii) If a'Ctthen each a(j,t)isa steady state and the following paira
ofinequalitiesSold with complementary slackness (i.e. at moat one in each
pair is strict)
utK,O) ￿(l&r)uTL ,l) + 61u(a,, 2(a)
2(b)
u3L,O) a (l_63)uS(a,l) +SsuS(t,O), 3(a)
3(b)
Theorem 2:(i) There exists a solution to inequalities (2) and (3), which we
denote a* and t,andthere exists an equilibriuz whoae set of steady states
is [a*, t*).(ii) If, in addition, uS and uT are concave in athen a* and t*
areunique and the only possible bfarkov perfect steady—state outcomes are
[a*,t*J and, if sanctions have limited capacity, .
Figure3 depicts equilibrium reaction functions that support steady
states [a*,t*].
Examole2:
Toillustrate th. theorems, we generalizeExample 1 to allow for
differencesbetween the cost of sanctions to the sender and to the target and






where a e (01] arid a a 0,l}. Cur restrictions onu5 and T require that:
1 > Cs > 1>C.0. F3 > 0,and FT > C,. (3)





> 1weare in the overkill
case arid I —
Conditions(2)and (3)takeshe following form (where, for convenience,
wereplateby w —:-&, thewidth of the band of steady states)
+ S FT (complementary with + s
C3 + (l8)￿ 23 (compLerenta with a a0)















isa measure of the sender's patience relative to the target's." If both
parties share a common discount factor S then a —8.Restrictions (5) imply
that 7* > 0 and, if either 85 or 8T converges to 1, then w*iO, so that the set
of steady states converges to a point.
Steady states may lie strictly between zero and one (Case I), a —0
(bliss for the target) may be a steady state (Case II), and a —I.(bliss for
the sender) may be a steady state (Case III).
Case I:If 0 < a* C a* + w* < ,thenthe range of steady states other
than a when sanctions have limited capacity) is (a*,a*+w*J ,where:
aF -F
s*_ +
'4As the time between choices tends to zero, a converges to T5' the
ratio of the target's continuous discount rate to the sender's. Since
—ei',where a is the interval between choices, the result follows from
LEopital's Rule.- 22-
whichincreases in FT snd a, and decreases in F3, T' and C3.25 Thus lowering
the cost of sanctions to the sender or increasing the sender's patience
relative to the targets raises the iow.r hound on steady—state performance
levels. Furthermore, as the lowest cost to the target of incurring sanctions,
- G,•or CT rises so does this bound. In this way the sender benefits from
being more patient than the target, andfrom havingsanctions that are
relatively acre painful for the target.
If the parties share a common discount factor that converges to tne then





If in addition, as in Zxsmple I. 33 — — Cand F5 —
FT
-C(so that the
costs of sanctions are symmetric) then the steady states converge to 1/2.
Thus,by the continuity of the expression for a*, if the two parties have
nearlyequal ccsts and patience, the outcome is nearly symmetric.
Case II:Zero can be supported as a steady state if and only if a* ￿ C
or, equivalantly, aF d F5. Thus if the target is sufficiently patient
relative to the sender, a steady—state performance level of sero can emerge:
Molding 6 constant belosi one, as approaches one, a approaches C so that
the inequelity is eatisfied.
If the parties have the same discount factor converging to one then the
condition is that Fr SF3:the highest possible cost of sanctions to the
25The result for aismost readily seen by observing that functions of the
form (ax-e-b)/(cx+d) are monotonic in x (by the quotient rule), so we need only
compare the expressions when x is zero and when x is infinite.2]
target is no greater than the lowest possible cost of sanctions to the sender.
Case Ill: An action level of one can be supported as a steady state if
and only if F1 —I,so that—I.or if T a 1 and a* +w-*￿ 1. If the
sender is sufficiently patient relative to the target and sanctions have
overkill capacity, then the sender can exact a performance level of one:
Holding & constant below one, as 6 approaches one, a* approaches F1/01 >1.
If the parties have the same discount factor converging to one then
a* +v*t I reduces to FT -CTF5 +C5:The lowest possible cost of
sanctions to the target is no less than their highest possible cost to the
sender.
-
InExample 1, C,1, —C5
—.5,Ft —1,and F5 —.5,so that a —1,and a
steady state at one can be supported, by Proposition 2. But if Ft is raised
slightly then the highest steady state that can be supported is less then one
(in fact, it is around one half if discount factors are similar). Thus
sanctions with overkill capacity can be Less effective than limited sancticns.
To see why, consider behavior just below any maximum sustainable steady
scata a. Ifis the unique steady state, sanctions cannot be too powerful
to deter balking at thresholds just below
.Infact, the target must balk at
such thresholds if the sender is to spurn all action levels below .However,
in any equilibrium that supports a steady state less than a, sanctions sre so
powerful that, below am, acquiescing strictly dominates balking. The target's
compliance removes the sender's incentive to spurn action levels just below
5aand such points become steady states as well, There is thus an
equilibrium determined by conditions (2) and (3) that supports a band of
steady-state action levels below .- 2A
Example2 illustrates that, if the sender can cormait itself, even for an
arbitrarily short while, to sanctions that are contingent on the subsequent
behavior of the target, then a considerable degree of rosipliance can be
enforced as parc of a Markov perfect equi].ibrium without sanctions actually
being suffered. If utility functions are as in Example 1, for S near one, the
sender will extract performance that is at least almost half the maximum
feasible level.
We have found the general characterization of limit equilibria of an
alternating nave game with contingent sanctions to be intractable. With
utility functions as in Example 2, we have verified that an equilibrium
oharatter.zed by Theorem 2(i) tan be a limit equilibrium.15 We have also found
that the equilibrium of Proposition 2 is not a limit equilibrium.
VI. Exacting a Single Action: Continuous Sanctions
5upose now chat the sender wanta the target to perform an irreversible
action, but continue to assume that sanctions are contingent, and that the
sender and target alternate in their decisions. Actions are dithotomsus,
(i.e., A —(CU).Once the target complies, setting a —1,interaction
ceases. As long as the target balks, setting a —0,however, the sender can
impose sanctions.
'5More exactly we have laboriously verified that in Case I, if the target
is the last mover then reaction functions have a similar form to thoee in the
proof of Theorem 2(i). As the horizon lengthens, these converge pointwise to
the Markov perfect equilibrium reaction functions. As time moves backward the
intervals of zarthing contract coward the band of steady states supported by
the Markov perfect equilibrium. We conjecture that similar results hold for
Cases II and III.- 25-
Whenthe target complies, its present discounted utility from that point
H on is normalized at -l and the senders is normalized at 1. If the target
balks then the next period the sender may impose aanttions a: some level a,
implying a current utility u5Cs) for itself and UT(S) forthetarget, both of
which decrease in s. We normalize ut(O) —ut)O)—0.Ftere we allow for a
tontinuum of sanctions, so that S —[0.1].
The expected discounted utility of the sender in any period before the




wherec(s) is the probability of compliance next period given s.The expected
discounted utility of the target in any period before it complies is;
Vt(s) —aaM1,0T(5) +STEu(s ) +
wheres is the current sanctions level and s' the (possibly randoe) level
chosen in the subsequent period if the target balks in the current period.
We define three key sanction levels. The first, 5m, is such that the
target is Just indifferent between complying and suffering 5m forever. It is
defined by the condition uT(s5)/(l6T) —-I.To be einiaaltv effective,
sanctions mustbe atleast
The second, 5h, is such that the target is Just indifferent between
complying and suffering 5b currently and never again. I: is defined by the
condition uT(ab) —-I.Obviously, if both exist,h >5mTo be brutally
ffgJ,yg,sanctionsmust exceed- 26
The third, s, is such that the sender is just indifferent between
imposing s currently if it ensures the target's compliance the next period,
and never inposing sanctions, ensuring permanent balking. It is defined by
the condition a3(5) +53
—0.Sanctions above s are incredibly costly,
There are tvo kinds of equilibria. If <5b if s cs not
brutally effective, then it is an equilibrium for the sender never to iapose
sanctions and for the target to comply if and only if sanctions are brutal.
The outcone is permanent balking with no sanctions, If s C5m,i.e., if
is not even minimally effective, then this is the only equilibrium outcome,
If, hovever, i.e., if is minimally effective, then another
equilibrium is for the target to comply if and only if sanctions are at least
and for the sender to impose sanctions at 3m, If the target moves first
and sanctions are initially not minimally effective then the outcome is
balking in the initial period, followed by the imposition (and suffering) of
sanctions at 5m in the next period, with compliance the period after that. If
> then this is the only equilibrium outcome. If 5m5i b i.e., if
is minimally, but not brutally effective, then both outcomes ate possible.
All the above are also limit equilibria eccept that there is no
multiplicity in this last case: Only permanent balking can be the outcome ci
a limit equilibrium here.
VII. Exacting a Single Action: A Single Sanction
If sanctions are dichotomous, eo that S —(0,11,then outcomes may be
much more coeplicated, and nastier for all: Sanctions may be experienced for
more than one period, and the target may delay complying for a while, but not27
necessarily forever. '
Inaccord with our earlier notation let u9(l) —-F5and uT(l) —
• .Falkmnr Forever: rneffecrive or I.oc:ed.iflycpscin.fam 012.5
Ifsanctions are not brutally effective (i.e. FTs1)then one
equilibriumis for the target always to balk and for the sender never to
imposesanctions. Ifsanctionsare not minimally effective (i.e. .FT
C
thenit is the only equilibrium. It is also the only equilibrium if sanctions
are incredibly costly (i.e., F5 >
However,if sanctions are brutally effective but not incredibly costly
then balking forever with no sanctiona csnnot be sn equilibrium outcome. The
sendercan eventually get the target to comply, but how itdoesso depends on
whether or not sanctions can deter balking.
Painful Corooli.snre: Nondeta.rrenrisnctions
A fourth key characteristic of sanctions istheir deterrence effect. If
&TFT>1-4then senctions are detertint:If the target is sure that balkic
willlead to such sanctions the next period, forcing it to coaply the period
after that, then it prefers to comply now,even if sanctions are not currently
inplace. Ifsanctiona are not deterrent or incredibly costly, but ore
minimallyeffective then, as with continuous sanctions, sn equilibrium is for
the target to balk in the absence of sanctions and to comply in their
presence, and for the sender always to impoae sanctions. The outcome is
'TMatsuysma's(1990) analysis of a trade liberalization gsme between a
government and a local firm,wherethe government wants the fin to become
moreefficient and the firm wants protection, and Fernandez and Glszer's
(1990)analysis of strikes, are similar to the gsmes considered here. In
either case, waiting and randomization can occur, and outcomes can be
inefficient,even though information is perfect.--
initialbalking, followed by sanctions, followed by compliance. If, also,
sanctions are brutally effective then this is the only equilibrium outcome.
MixedStrstav£pujflbria
However,if sanctions are deterrent then the sender will not always
impose them: If it did, then the threat of sanctions two periods hence would
suffice to enforce compliance the next period, so there is no reason to impose
sanctions currently. If sanctiona are deterrent then the only possible
equilibria in which the target complies involve mixed strategies.
If sanctions ere deterrent and not incredibly costly then an equilibrium
is for the sender to mposa sanctions randomly, and for the target to comply
if sanctions are in place, and to randomize between complying and balking in
their absence (i.e.. mixing at condoning). If, in addition, sanctions are
brutally effective, this is the only equilibrium.
The outcome supported by this equilibrium is on. in which some delay is
expected before the target complies. It may comply without sanctions, or
sanctions may ce imposed in the period before compliance. Sanctions will not
last for acre than one period, however.
In another equilibrium in which the sender randomizes, the target mixes
between balking and compliance when sanctions are in effect, and always balks
in their absence (i.e., mixing at sanctions). This can occur when sanctions
are minimally, but not brutally, effective and are not incredibly costly.
Figure 4 illustrates the various possible outcomes as a function of the
cost of sanctions to the target Fr and the target's discount factor
assuming that sanctiona are not incredibly costly. Three ourves divide the
region of possible values into five parts. Above the hotizontal line FT —129 -
sanctionsare brutal while below the diagonal line FT —15Tthey are nor even
minimally effective. Above the curve —16T
- sanctionsare deterrent.
The diagram indicates the possible outcomes in each region.
The Limit equilibria in the various cases are as follows: Below the
brutality boundary only balking forever can occur, while psiniul comoliance
remainsthe equilibrium outcome above the brutality boundary and below the
deterrence boundary. Above these two boundaries, the finite-horizon
equilibrium is for the sender to impose sanctions every 2i periods from the
period of the sender's last possible move, where i satisfies the conditions
thet F5 +
F3+4i"l,
and for the target to comply if sanctions
are in effect and otherwise to balk, except just before sanctions are
scheduled.
-
Theoutcome is balking until the period before the first scheduled
sanctions, at which time ths target complies.
Taking the appropriate limit gives i limit equilibria, indexed by the
time of the first scheduled sanctions. These equilibria are not Markov
perfect, however: Choices depend upon elapsed time, which is payoff
irrelevant. They are also not renegotiation proof: Whenever sanctions ars
mandated both sender and target prefer to delay them.
VtII. Conclusion
We have considered the ability of sanctions to exact concessions in a
variety of circumstances. A conclusion ia that sanctions that are costly for
the sender to impose can be credible. A necessary condition to ensure their
success in exacting concessions, however, is that the harts caused by the
sanctions depend on the target's degree of compliance. Otherwise, sero
compliance is always a possible outcome. Sanctions that are purely spiteful- 30-
(in-the sense thatthe harm that they do doesnotdepend on thetaget's
subsequent behavior) do not ensure compliance.
We have limited ourselves to the interaction of only two parties. We
thus ignore the public-goods issues raised by having multiple senders (which
have undermined recent attempts to iaspose sanctions agsinsc the Feople's
Republic of China). We also ignore the issues that arise when distinct groups
within one country have diverse interests. ILS. farmers, for example, bore
the brunt of the U.S. grain embargo against the Soviet Union, while the
actions sought by the United States in Japan in recent negotiations under
"Super 301' were apparently welcosed by most Japanese consumers,
We have also allowed sanctions to go only one way, If both parties can
take actions with external benefits and impose punishments then many more
possibilities emerge. Characterizations as tight as those in Theorem 2 are
thus unlikely.
Our analysis has focused solely on situations of symmetric information.
Even in these, complisnce may be delayed, and outcomes can be inefficient in
that sanctions nay actually have to be used. Informaritnal asymmetries are
likely to increase the pursntial for delay and inefficisncy.
Finally, the differences between the sisultaneous and alternating nove
equilibria denonatrste the critical importance of timing. A better
understanding of timing would emerge from a model with information lags as
wall as response lags: Each party learns the othet's choice only with delay,
and makes its own decision only with further delay, The alternating case
describes a situation with long response lags relative to information lags,
while the simultaneous case is more descriptive of the opposite. Modern
communications technology and political institutions suggest that the first
situation better describes the environment in which governments set policy.- 31-
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APPENDIXA: DERIVATION OF RENEGOTIATION-PROOF PAYOFFS IN THE REPEATED
SIMULTANEOUS HOVE GAME
Farrell and Msakin'a (1987) criterion that a subgaoe perfsct equilibrium
berenegotiation-proof requires that the equilibrium have no subgames that
Pareto-dominate others. The justification is that, otherwise, when shout to
embark on a dominated subgame all players would benefit by agreeing to switch
strategies to the Pareto-preferred one, and what's to stop them from doing so?
To determine what restrirtions this requirement imposes on a pure
strategy equilibrium, tonsider the beginning of the subgame of the game that
is worstfromthe target's perspective. Let v5 and VT denote rhe average per
period payoffs from that period on to the sender and target respectively.




where vt is i's first-petiod expected payoff and is the average per-period
payoff for the remainder of the subgsme, which is itself another subgame,
Since VT is the lowest payoff of any subgame to the target, VT ￿v,and
since VT is a convexcombinationof and 4.4 ￿vTNv.Since v
therequirement that no subgame Pareto dominate any ocher implies that v
v5. Since v5 is a convex combination of v5 and v, 4v5 ￿
However,nothing can be worse for the target than ohooaing its dominant
strategy and finding itself again atthebeginning of its worst subgame, i.e.,
VT 5 (1 flu (Os)+
&VTT(0)
The condition thata ipiies that
These constraints on V3andv restrict the set of possible payoffs to
lie within the shaded regions in Figures Ia and lb. (The parallel exercise
perforued fron the perspective ofthesender iaposea no restrictions onthe
setofsustainablesubgame perfect payoffs.)
The upper bound aon the steady-state performance level iraplied by the
condition that the epuiiibrium be renegotiation-proof isthusdetermined by
the twoconditicns:




The following is a renegotiation proof equilibrium that in thelimitas
Hi, can sustain a:
Define the following modes:- 35-
Regularmode; a—;,a—O
Punishment mode; a —1,s —s
Zero mode: a —0,a —0.
The equilibrium strategies call upon the parties to:(i) adhere to punishment
mode if, in any of the last N periods the target haa aet a C a if the game
was in regular mode or a C 1 if the game waa in punishment mode: (ii) adhere
to zero mode if the aender haa ever set a C s in punishment mode; (UI)
adhere to regular mode otherwiae.
-
ForS sufficiently close to 1 and N sufficiently large, the equilibrium




u (a,0) I' u (0,5),
which permit steady-state action levels a arbitrarily close to a.
An increase in the cost of sanctions to the target raises a, while an
increase in their cost to the sender lowers a. Using Zxaniple 2 ci the text
F/(F5 + Cs + FT).- 3d-
APPENDIXB; PROOFS
Proot oL Procosition I: Assume that R5(a) —3for all a '5T(0)R70) oust
consist of a single point. (If it included points a1 < a2, since both elicit
zero sanctions, and since decreases in a, a1 would be a better response to
0 for the target than a2, so a2RT(O).) So let a denote RT(0). For any
a < a, R5(a) must exceed C with positive probability. (Otherwise a would be a
better response to 0 than afor the target.)
For all s,RT(s) '5 a with probability one. (For any choice a> aby the
target its current utility is lower, and the sanctions outcome no more
favora'ole than at a.)
For the sender, then, setting s —0is better than setting s >0at any
action level a. (Setting s —0elicits the highest possible performance level
by the target at the least possible cost to the sender.) Hence R5(a) —3for
all a.
But if the sender doss not impose sanctions under gy circuostanoes then
the target's only best response can be Ri(s) —0For alt s. 0
Proof of Propositton..2: By continuity a exists and, because uT is decreasing
in a, it is unique and lies between 0 sod ;.Thussiiswell defined.
Verifying that a pair of reaction functiona K5 and constitute an
equilibrium requires demonstrating that!(I) if the sender adheres to then
Riisoptimal for the target; and (ii) if the target adheres to R then K5 is
optimal for the sender, With dynamic progrsrweing, optimality csn be
denonstrated by verifying that: (i) if the sender adheres to K5, and the
target will adhere to Riinthe future, then RT(t) is oprirsal for the target- 37-
currentlyatanyfeasible threshold t; and (ii) if the target adheres to BY,
andthe sender will adhere to in the future, then a5(a) is optimal for the
sender currently at any feasible action level a.
In principle one must consider all possihle actions as alternatives to
RT(t)and all possible thresholds as alternatives to R5(a) However, since a5
T
and R are piecewise nondecreasing, each term in the expression:
Z5(s,t) —E(u5a,c(t,a)J+S50[RT(t) ,C(t.RT(tfl] +svS[RT(t,J
isnondecreasingin texcept,possibly, at points of discontinuity in one of
the three terms, while each term in the expression:
ZT(t,a) —E(uT(au(t,a)J+ [a,o(R(a),a)1 +4vT:aS(a)]}
isdecreasing in a except, possibly, at points of discontinuity in one of the
thtee terms. Hence it suffices to check that these points as well as 0 and
are not superior to the prescribed actions. Perfonoing this operation is
routine, and verifies the result. D
Proof of Lemma 1: We show that if spurning is optimal at some point a then
below a only spurning is optimal. If it is optimal for the sender to spurn a
then It > a,suchthat:
V5(a) —u5(a,l)+55W5(t)u5(a,O) +S5WS(x)Vx ￿ a.
Consider the sender's response to any b Ca.The above inequality and he
condition that u5(a,0) -u3(a,l)strictly increases in a imply that:- 38-
— u5(bl)+ >u3(b,O) +65W(x)x b. D
ProofofLeiimip1: Suppose noe. Then 3c > b such char c a CS(b) Hence:
V5(a) —u5(a,l)+55W3(b)￿Z5(a,c)—u(a,l)+
and:
V5(b) —u5(b,l)+55d(c) -US(b,c)+ £3W3(b)
The second ineualicy implies W3(c) > W5(b). which contradicts thefirst
Proof of Lemma 3:For t￿ nthisfoLlowsby monotonicicy. For c C n,since
u3(a3) +FgJS(t) —Z3(at)—V5(a)a Z3(a,n) u5(aC) +
S S
W (r) a V (n) and so
EuS[RT(t),O] +&5V3[RT(r)J)W(t) a W3(n)a u5(n,O)+
whichis only possible if 3b E RT(t) such that b an.Thus
—zT(t,b)—ZT(b)avT(fl).- 39-
En€fofLate 4;
(1) T() a UT(fl,Q) > T(0) +6rE(VTIRS(a)fla jT() by Lemma 3,
(ii)T.Ye show that if a> n then aCr(). That RT(n) —ii thenfoLLows
imnediatoLy.Ifa> n then, by (1) JT(a) < ,-andso
ZT(ta) —uT(a,D)+5tTacUCn,O+srwT(n)
—ZT(t,n)
(iii) By (ii),W5(t)a u3(n,O) +sEcvs[aT(t)]a un,ô +
55V5(T1)
C
















sinteE(VT(RS(n)J —vTcn).by Lemma3.and because R5(n) dn. 0- £Lo-
Proofof Leiejea5:If t1C t2 then,by nonotonicity, Vt(s1) a v"Rt2 If




Thus t2e Band VT(t2) —VT(i1),o
Prool of Theorem 1.: (i)Wefirst show that—Iis impossible if L a a-
Suppose that (a convergas to .— 1from below. Thus the target never balks
at an. By condoning an fcrever the sender obtains u (a ,O)/(lg) which
converges cc l/(l-i). which excaeds the value of spurning to one,
÷ 6/(l-S)<u5(l,l)+5/(l-&)Cl/(l-6).This contradicts
—1.Thus ; C1, andso B is not empty.
We can thus find a sequence of thresholds tl.asuch that taB and the n
sender does not spurn t.(Ifa —1,for each n choose t —a;if not, n — n —
choosetn > a.) Since tn is not spurned, the value to the target of
acquiescing to tn is at least UT(t,O)/(l.51). Butsincetn V B, che tar;et
is willing to balk. Hence V —Vt(t)a uT(rn,c)/usT, and the limit gives
v uTL,o)/.6T),
If there is a steady state at a, then, vT(a) —uT(a,o)/(l.ST).By Lemma 1,
ad j,sothat V a —uTCo)/(l.gT)u(j,O)/(l-&) aV bythe above
inequality.
Hence a is the unique steady state and VTCB) —11,By Lemma 2, balking to
a Caprovokes spurning to ta a .Sinces a B, balking yields
uT(a,j(l+5) + &V, which is maximized at a —C.Hence the optimal balk is- 41-
to0, implying that V —0,and hence uT(B,O) —0,so that g —
(ii)Each point n in the interval (at) satisfies the assumptions of Lena4.
Thus RT(n) —n,by (ii), and since VS is increasing on this interval, by (v)
—n,so that each point ri is a steady state, The inequalities 2(a) and
2(b) follow from the requirement that, at thresholds ttt, matching is at
leaat as good as balking to levels 4a (2(a)) and to zero forever (2(b)).
The inequality 3(a) follows from the requirement that, at levels aia,
spurning to thresholds is no better than marching.
Turning to the complementary slackness conditions, we first show that, if
0 •,v—VT(t)—uTL,3)/(l5T).Takinga sequence of thresholds tntZ shows
that VS VTLt)SuTt,o)/(lsT), by monotonicity. sttar >a,so
V —V(t)zT(t,t) a UT(t,0a+6T +4v,
and,taking the limit as tL, and combining the previous two inequalities
V a uTL,D)/(l&r) a VT(t) a V
so that VT(t) —uTL,o),(lsT
—V.Hence, at ,thetargetis indifferent
between balking and matching. We now show that the target never chooses an
action level above .
Thevalue of condoning any a at is Z5(e,t) — u(a.0)+SW5(t).But by
Lemma 4(v), 1J(t)isincreasing on (gQ.HenceC5(a) a so that choosing an
action level above ; yields thetargetat most u'(t,O)(l+ST) 44V
C V.Thus
St forall t.
Inparticular, CtL) s t,whichimplies that- 42-
— u5,O)+ a u(;D)(l+s)+
ByLemisa i(v), for all n 4 (at) ,.u1(n,O)/(l-65)
—V5(n)aV5()by
conttonicty. Taking the limit as ott au5LC)/(l-S) which, combined
with the above inequality implies that v5L) —W5(r)—
Vanow establish the complementary slackness of 2(a) and 2(b) showing
that if ,<tthen 2(a) is an equality. It is not optimal for the target to
balk to a level above a because JT(a) is decreasing on (at), by Lemma 4(vi).
Balking to below a yields at most 5V (since the sender then spurns to a
threshold t>, becauseV5(t)isincreasing on (at), by Lemma 4(v)). If
t< t thenV >0,so that 4 V. Hence the optimal balk must be to
itself.
Since a < ,aT)a and, ainc by Leisa 4(vi) WT is decreasing on
T S T.
(a.t)4() —. ByLamms 3, ,(becauseV ts decreast.ng on (at)),
and so
vTL —ZTL,a)-uTLO)+B1VTLaUTL0)U-6T) +4vTc.
Henoe VT(S) a uTL,o)/(lsT). By Lemma 4(fl), for all n e(a,t),
uT(n,o)/(l.6r) —VT(n)a VT(S) by monoconicity. Taking the limit as n(S,
vT(a auT(S,O)/(l6T)which, combined with the above inequality, implies that
vTc —WTL)—
Since,then, at ,bothmatching and balking to a are optimal:
uTc,o)/(l.;T) —V—ZTLS)—uTL,l)+&Ta)
—uTL,l)+-43-
so that 2(a) holds with equality.
To establish the coepleisentary slackness of the second pair of
inequalities we show that if > 0 then 3(a) holds with equality. If the
sander faces a < ,matchingyields at least u5(s,O)/(l-&3). By Lerorsa 1-,
belcw a it is optimal to spurn. By Lemma 4(v) is increasing on (at), so
the best spurn is to ; or above. But, since only balking occurs above ,the
best spurn is to itself. Such a spurn yields
u5(a,l) + —u5(a,l)+
Thus 3(a) holds with equality, 0
Proof of ThaoxesL..2:(I) Let
fT(s) —max(t E ro,:uT(t,o)B (l81)uT(a,1) +
and
f5(a) —tax{t C [0,t]: u5(a,0) (l-55)u3(a,l) + 55u3(t,0fl.
Thus, for each a, ft(a) (respectively f5(a)) gives the t which makes 2(a)
(respectively 3(a)) Just binding, or E,ifno such t exists. Because u5 and
ut are continuous, so areandif5. Because ut and u5 are monotonic, ft and
fb are nondecreasing end Va [O,tJ, f5(s) B a and ft(a) B a.
If fT(0) a f5(0) then a* —0, t*fT(0) is a solution to (2) and (3).
fl f'(0) > f5(0) then either 3a E (0,EJ such that fT(5) < f5(a), so that there
is an interior solution to 2(a) and 3(e) by the intermediate value theorem, or44 -
elsefl E(GE),LT(a) >f8(a)so that a* —mmIa: f5(a) —r)and t* —t15
asolution to (2) and (3).
Given these values of a* and t*,thefollowing is an equilibrium that
supports (a*, Ca]asstaady states:
a a C[a*,t*]
2. (a) —
Cea < a* or a a t
Ct C]O,a) u [a*,c*]
2. (t)—
a* C [a,a*) U (t*,1)
where a satisfies:
uT(a,t) + ;Tu(al) —(uT(a*,o)4uT(e*,o)]/(l.eT),
ifsucha value exists, and a —0otherwise.
Checking that this constitutes an equilibrium is routine.
(ii)Werewrite (2) and (3):
uT(a,0)
-UT(e,o)a (l6T)uT[L 0) -uTL,l)J, 2'(a)
$ 2h)
(l53)[uSL,O) -u5L,l)] 6st,0) - uSLtOfl,3'(a)
aaO. 3(b)
Suppose that there stare two distinct solutions (a1t) and (a2 C3). 2y strict- 45-
monotonicityof the utilityfunctions, weassusie without loss of generality
that a1 <a2 and t1 C t2. Thus 3(a) is an equality at (a2,t2) and 2'(s) is
an equality at (a1,t1). Lowering a from 22 to 21 lowers the left-hand side of
3(a) and, hence, the right-hand side. Since u5(a,O) is increasing and
concave, t1-a1 -C t7-a2.
-
Raisinga from 1 to a2 raises neither the right-hand side of 2' (a) nor
the left-hand side. Since u(a,O) is decreesing and concave this implies that
R t2-a2. Uniqueness of the solution to (2) and (3) follows frors this
contradiction. Itfollowsfros Theorem 1 that the only possible steady states
are a and (a*,t*J. UJ!
aIs 9r w.
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içure 4
EQ(J[LtSRLL'I JLTCOM9 WHEN ThE SENCEa 3E!S AN LREE/ERSIELE ACTIEN 45Th A SENCLE SANCItCA